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Theoretical neuroscience has experienced explosive growth over the past 20 years. In addition to bringing
new researchers into thefieldwithbackgrounds inphysics,mathematics, computer science, andengineering,
theoretical approaches have helped to introduce new ideas and shape directions of neuroscience research.
This review presents some of the developments that have occurred and the lessons they have taught us.Introduction
Twenty years ago, when Neuron got its start, theoretical neuro-
sciencewas experiencing a start of its own.Of course, therewere
important theoretical contributions to neuroscience long before
1988, most notably: the development of what we now call the
integrate-and-fire model by Lapicque in 1907; the modeling of
the action potential by Hodgkin and Huxley, a brilliant theoretical
offshoot of their experimental work; the development of dendritic
and axonal cable theory by Wilfred Rall; and the broad insights
of David Marr. Nevertheless, over the past 20 years, theoretical
neuroscience has changed from a field practiced by a few mul-
titalented experimentalists anddedicated theorists (JackCowan,
Steven Grossberg, John Rinzel, and Terry Sejnowski being early
examples) sparsely scattered around the world to an integral
component of virtually every scientificmeeting andmajor depart-
ment. Something has changed. How did this happen, and what
impact has it had?
Two developments in themid-1980s set the stage for the rapid
expansion of theoretical neuroscience. One was the populariza-
tion of the backpropagation algorithm for training artificial neural
networks (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986). This greatly ex-
panded the range of tasks that artificial neural networks could
perform and led to a number of people entering neural network
research. Around the same time, Amit, Gutfreund, and Sompo-
linsky (Amit et al., 1985) showed how amemory model proposed
byHopfield (1982) could be analyzed usingmethods of statistical
physics originally designed for spin glasses. The sheer beauty
of this calculation drew a large batch of physicists into the field.
These new immigrants entered with high confidence-to-knowl-
edge ratios that, hopefully, have been reduced through large
growth in the denominators and more modest adjustments of
the numerators.
What has a theoretical component brought to the field of neu-
roscience? Neuroscience has always had models (how would
it be possible to contemplate experimental results in such com-
plex systems without a model in one’s head?), but prior to the in-
vasion of the theorists, these were often word models. There are
several advantages of expressing a model in equations rather
than words. Equations force a model to be precise, complete,
and self-consistent, and they allow its full implications to be
worked out. It is not difficult to find word models in the conclu-
sions sections of older neuroscience papers that sound reason-
able but, when expressed as mathematical models, turn out tobe inconsistent and unworkable. Mathematical formulation of a
model forces it to be self-consistent and, although self-consis-
tency is not necessarily truth, self-inconsistency is certainly
falsehood.
A skillful theoretician can formulate, explore, and often reject
models at a pace that no experimental program can match. This
is a major role of theory—to generate and vet ideas prior to full
experimental testing. Having active theoretical contributors in
the field allows us collectively to contemplate a vastly greater
number of solutions to the many problems we face in neurosci-
ence. Both theorists and experimentalists generate and test
ideas, but due to the more rapid turnover time in mathematical
and computational compared to experimental analyses, theo-
rists can act as initial filters of ideas prior to experimental inves-
tigation. In this regard, it is the theorist’s job to develop, test,
frequently reject, and sometimes promote new ideas.
Theoretical neuroscience is sometimes criticized for not mak-
ing enough predictions. This is part of a pre-versus-post debate
about the field that has nothing to do with synapses. Although
there are notable examples of predictions made by theorists
and later verified by experimentalists in neuroscience, examples
of postdictions are far more numerous and often more
interesting. To apply prediction as the ultimate test of a theory
is a distortion of history. Many of the most celebrated moments
in quantitative science—the gravitational basis of the shape of
planetary orbits, the quantumbasis of the spectrum of the hydro-
gen atom, and the relativistic origin of the precession of the orbit
of Mercury—involved postdictions of known and well-character-
ized phenomena. In neuroscience especially, experimentalists
have gotten a big head start. There is nothing wrongwith amodel
that ‘‘postdicts’’ previously known phenomena. The key test of
the value of a theory is not necessarily whether it predicts some-
thing new, but whether it makes postdictions that generalize to
other systems and provide valuable new ways of thinking.
The development of a theoretical component to neuroscience
research has had significant educational impact across the bio-
logical sciences. The Sloan-Swartz initiative, for example, has
supported almost 80 researchers who successfully transitioned
from other fields to faculty positions in neuroscience. Jim Bower
and Christof Koch set up the computational neuroscience
course at Woods Hole, a summer course that is still educating
people with backgrounds in both the biological and physical sci-
ences and that has been copied in courses around the world.Neuron 60, November 6, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 489
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but now many life sciences students have a solid knowledge of
basic mathematics and computer programming, and those that
don’t at least feel guilty about it. A number of developments have
led to this shift, the rise of theoretical neuroscience certainly
being one of them.
The following sections provide a sparse sampling of theoreti-
cal developments that have occurred over the past 20 years and
discuss some of the things they have taught us. The presentation
is idiosyncratic, with some developments presented in a different
context than when they first appeared and perhaps from what
their creators intended, and many important achievements
ignored entirely. The focus is on lessons learned from a subset
of the theoretical advances over the past 20 years.
Basic Principles
Many researchers have sought basic principles to help guide us
through the complexities of neural circuits and cognition. Exam-
ples, discussed in the following paragraphs, are efficient coding,
Bayesian inference, generative models, causality, and what I call
the positivity of the neural code. The last of these, perhaps more
accurately termed a basic constraint, is consider in a bit more
detail to highlight a number of different developments.
The efficient coding hypothesis, formulated by Horace Barlow
(Barlow, 2001), postulates that sensory systems are adapted to
convey information about natural stimuli faithfully using aminimal
amount of activity. This idea has been used to account for the
receptive field properties of neurons in the retina (Atick and Red-
lich, 1990) and lateral geniculate nucleus (Dong and Atick, 1995),
in primary visual cortex (Olshausen and Field, 1996; Bell and
Sejnowski, 1997), in the fly visual system (van Hateren, 1997;
Niven et al., 2007), and in the auditory system (Lewicki, 2002).
An offshoot of this work has been a better understanding of the
statistical properties of natural stimuli, such as visual scenes
(Field, 1987; Tolhurst et al., 1992; Ruderman and Bialek, 1994;
van der Schaaf and van Hateren, 1996).
The application of Bayesian inference to both neural systems
and the behaviors they generate is another ‘‘first principles’’ ap-
proach to neuroscience. As an example of Bayesian inference,
suppose that our faith in a certain statement S being true is char-
acterized by a probability P(S). Now, imagine that we make an
observation O that occurs with probability P(OjS) if S is true
and with probability P(O) whether or not S is true. Bayesian infer-
ence says that our belief in the veracity of the statement S after
this observation should be P(S)P(OjS)/P(O). The key point here is
that our belief in S upon observation of O should change by an
amount that depends on the how much more likely the truth of
S makes O, quantified by the ratio P(OjS)/P(O). Suppose that S
is the statement that a pair of dice is loaded, and O is the obser-
vation of several consecutive rolls of double 6. This observation
clearly increases the probability that S is true and, according to
Bayesian inference, it should do so to the extent that the loaded
dice hypothesis makes those rolls more likely. Bayesian infer-
ence thus provides a principle for quantifying the effect that
evidence should have on belief (specifically how new evidence
and prior expectation should be combined), and it can be used
to derive optimal ways that multiple forms of evidence should
be weighed inmaking a decision. On the behavioral level, Bayes-490 Neuron 60, November 6, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.ian inference has been applied to quantify how subjects combine
multiple sources of information in proportion to their reliability
(Ernst and Banks, 2002) and to account for aspects of motor
control (Kording and Wolpert, 2006) and perception (Knill and
Richards, 1996; Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006). In addition, pro-
posals have been made for how such computations might be
performed at the neuronal level (Ma et al., 2006).
A major problem we face in contemplating memory storage or
perceptual processing is that we do not understand how neural
activity represents information beyond fairly early stages in sen-
sory processing. Generative models provide a guiding principle
for thinking about higher-order neural representations (Hinton
and Ghahramani, 1997; Rao et al., 2002). In a generative model,
patterns of neural activity in a high-level area must not only rep-
resent the data, theymust also be capable of generating patterns
of activity at earlier sensory stages, through back-projections,
that resemble the activity evoked by the external world. Repre-
sentations with such generative capabilities provide a good
basis for constructing networks that perform complex tasks (see,
for example, Hinton et al., 2006).
Causality, the temporal relationship between cause and effect,
is a basic fact of life that has important scientific implications,
quantified in physics by the Kramers-Kronig relations. In neuro-
science, we have Hebb’s rule of synaptic plasticity and its likely
biophysical substrate, spike-timing-dependent plasticity, or
STDP (Dan and Poo, 2006). Hebb stated that a synapse should
be strengthened when it participates in causing a postsynaptic
neuron to fire, and STDP not only realizes this rule and its causal-
ity condition, it also leads to weakening of synapses when there
is correlated pre- and postsynaptic activity that is not causally
ordered in time. The theoretical implications of STDP have occu-
pied and continue to engage theorists across a wide range of ap-
plications (for example, Gerstner et al., 1996; Song and Abbott,
2001; Buchs and Senn, 2002; Nowotny et al., 2003; Morrison
et al., 2007; Izhikevich, 2007; Kang et al., 2008).
Spike counts and neuronal firing rates are positive quantities.
This simple fact has important implications for neural coding and
neural circuits that provide a framework for thinking about a num-
ber of research directions taken over the past 20 years. Suppose
that a set of different events results in various numbers of
spikes being delivered to a neuron over a short period of time.
The incoming action potentials appear on N separate presynap-
tic afferents. With such an arrangement, we would expect the
number of incoming action potentials averaged across events to
be proportional to N, because each input contributes a positive
number to the total. Being an average over all events, this
order-N input contains no information about the identity of any
individual event. Such identity is contained in the event-to-event
variance of each input about its average value. Note that this
event-related variance is not noise; it is the signal that provides
information about the distinctive properties of each event. If we
assume that the inputs react independently to the different
events, we expect these variances to add, producing a total
event-related variance that is, like the average, proportional to
N. Because the variance is a squared quantity, this means that
the amplitude of the fluctuations that provide information about
event identity is only proportional to
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p
. Thus, the ratio of the
component of the total input that is useful for discriminating
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ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p
=N= 1=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p
. For N of order 10,000, this ratio is only 1%. In
other words, the large number of inputs to a neuron, which is
a key feature of most neural circuits, appears in this light to be
a liability rather than an advantage. When integrating a large
number of synapses, the information-carrying fluctuations in
input spiking can get drowned out by the noninformative din pro-
vided by the average rate of input spiking. A number of features
of neuronal circuitry that have been studied by both experimental
and theoretical neuroscientists over the past 20 years can be
seen as responses to this basic problem.
How can this problem be solved? Proposed solutions can be
divided into three broad classes: (1) correlate the inputs, (2) re-
duce N, and (3) make use of a balance between excitation and
inhibition to cancel the noninformative component of the total
input. Correlating the inputs means modifying the assumption
that the different inputs to a neuron are independent. It we take
the extreme case when, instead, all the inputs carry the same
information, the problem is solved because the event-related
variance is of order N2 rather than N. This makes the ratio of in-
formative to noninformative signal of order 1 rather than 1=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p
.
Solutions of this form are seen at early stages of sensory pro-
cessing, most dramatically in olfaction, where receptors with
similar response characteristics project to common targets.
Away from the periphery, the idea can still be applied by using
correlation or synchrony to boost the efficacy of informative sets
of inputs. Correlated or synchronous presynaptic action poten-
tials have a greater impact on the response of a postsynaptic
neuron than asynchronous spikes (Salinas and Sejnowski, 2001;
Womelsdorf and Fries, 2007). Applying this idea to the 1=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p
problem amounts to overcoming the suppression of the informa-
tive part of the total input by postulating that information-carrying
signals are correlated or synchronized, perhaps by being locked
to various rhythmic patterns of neural activity (Kopell et al., 2000).
Another solution to the 1=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p
problem is to reduce the effective
value ofN. In our original estimate, we tookN to be the number of
synaptic inputs receivedby aneuron, but it is really only the active
synapses that enter into the argument. Sparse coding is a way of
reducingN by keeping the number of neurons responding to any
given event or feature small. Synapses can be strengthened to
compensate for the smaller number of inputs to keep the post-
synaptic neuron responding. As discussed above, sparse coding
has been proposed as an important principle of neuronal sensory
processing for reasons independent of the ones given here. An-
other way of reducing the effective number of inputs is through
local dendritic processing. The idea, advanced most passion-
ately by Bartlett Mel (Poirazi et al., 2003), is that the basic unit
of neural computation is not the neuron with its thousands of in-
puts, but pieces of the dendrite with far fewer. In this case, local
dendritic spiking as well as stronger synapses can compensate
for the reduced value of N. This work is part of a general revitali-
zation in the theoretical study of dendritic processing (see, for ex-
ample, Segev and London, 2000) that has been inspired by new
data coming from dendritic patching.
Finally, we come to an extremely interesting approach to the
problem, which is to suppress the noninformative component
of the total input to a neuron through balancing inhibition. Histor-
ically, the idea of balancing excitation and inhibition arosethrough consideration of the high-degree of variability in neuro-
nal responses (Softky and Koch, 1992), but it can be viewed
equally well as a way of canceling positive average inputs. Recall
that the noninformative component is the order N contribution
coming from the average firing rate of all the presynaptic inputs
to a neuron. If we arrange these inputs so that their excitatory
and inhibitory effects cancel, it would appear we could eliminate
the effects of this component entirely, making the ratio of infor-
mative to noninformative signals as large as we want. However,
this form of cancellation is not that easy. It is unreasonable to as-
sume that excitatory and inhibitory presynaptic action potentials
could be matched perfectly, one-for-one. This means that the
subtraction of excitatory input by inhibition is necessarily a noisy
business, and the ratio can only be raised to something of order
1. Networks that realize this idea have extremely interesting
properties (van Vreeswijk and Sompolinsky, 1996; Brunel,
2000) and provide us with reasonable models of the ongoing,
background activity seen in most circuits even in the absence
of sensory input or behavioral output. In particular, it seems likely
that cortical circuits operate in this ‘‘balanced’’ mode (Shadlen
and Newsome, 1994; Troyer and Miller, 1997), and this realiza-
tion represents an important advance in our understanding of
how these circuits operate.
What Are Neural Circuits Doing and How
Are They Doing It?
Before we can address how a neural circuit works, we must fig-
ure out what it does. Of course, these circuits are responsible for
perception, cognition, and action, but the precise roles they play
in these processes can be mysterious. Neural models can be
divided into two classes depending on whether they address
the what or the how of neural responses. Mathematical descrip-
tions of the relationship between neural responses and the stim-
uli that evoke them can produce precise statements about what
a system is doing. Circuit-level models that try to account for
these relationships on the basis of known physiological features
explore how a circuit works. Of course, many models, including
some of those assigned below to one category or another,
bridge this distinction. It is nevertheless a useful way to catalog
a large body of research.
Except in cases of synaptic transmission by graded potentials,
neurons convey information through the timing of their action
potentials. (As an aside, a lot of pointless debate over the past
20 years could have been avoided if we had all kept in mind that
this statement is not necessarily in conflict with the idea that
action potential firing can be described by a firing rate.) The
work of Bill Bialek and his collaborators has advanced our under-
stand of and ability to quantify the encoding of information by ac-
tion potentials through the use of information theory (Rieke et al.,
1996). In addition, this research program has spawned newways
of relating neuronal responses to the stimuli that generate them
by extended older methods of spike-triggered averaging to
spike-triggered covariance (see Rieke et al., 1996) andmaximum
informative dimensions (Sharpee et al., 2004).
LNP models—which apply a linear filter to a stimulus (L), pass
the result of this filtering through anonlinear function (N), and then
generate action potentials by a Poisson process (P)—provide
some of our best descriptions of what neurons do. VariousNeuron 60, November 6, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 491
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sponse normalization (Heeger, 1992) and the realization that
optimal solutions can be derived in a wider class of models that
include postspike refractoriness and correlations between neu-
rons (Paninski et al., 2007) have broadened the applicability of
this approach. Thesedescriptions often include clues aboutwhat
the underlying biophysical mechanisms might be, so they pro-
vide a solid basis for constructing circuit-based models of how
responses are generated.
Circuit-level models address how specific patterns of neural
activity are generated by sensory stimuli or as part of motor ac-
tions. In this context, the theorist’s task is to construct a model
that reproduces, as much as possible, neural activity recorded
during experiments. This form of modeling has been applied
extensively to the primary visual cortex where the features to
be explained are typically the response selectivities of simple
and complex cells (Worgotter and Koch, 1991; Somers et al.,
1995; Sompolinsky and Shapley, 1997; Chance et al., 1999;
Miller, 2003; Tao et al., 2004). We now have plausible mecha-
nisms for how simple and complex cells obtain their basic re-
sponse characteristics. Although no single consensus about how
the circuits of primary visual cortex operate has arisen from this
body of work, this may simply reflect the fact that multiple mech-
anisms contribute. In other words, many of these ideas are prob-
ably correct in one way or another, and the wealth of ideas in this
field shouldbeviewedasasuccess.Circuit-levelmodeling is now
advancing beyond primary sensory areas (for example, Cadieu
et al., 2007) and to the consideration of phenomena such as
working memory through sustained activity (Amit and Brunel,
1997; Compte et al., 2000; Seung et al., 2000) and decision mak-
ing (Wang, 2002; Machens et al., 2005).
Physiology and anatomy provide the constraining framework
for model building, and we are on the threshold of an explosion
in the amount of data available for this purpose due to a major
initiative in neuroscience to determined the ‘‘connectome.’’ This
will involve mapping neural circuits at an unprecedented level of
resolution and detail. Theoretical work by Mitya Chklovskii and
his collaborators (for example, Wen and Chklovskii, 2008) has
help provide a rationale for some of the basic features of neuro-
anatomy, but more needs to be done to prepare us for the chal-
lenges of this data onslaught. In this regard, it is instructive to
consider artificial networks as examples of large complex sys-
tems performing useful tasks for which we have complete con-
nectomes. What can we learn from the complete connectome
or, indeed, a complete mathematical description of a complex
artificial network model?
First, what can’t we learn? It is unlikely, for example, that we
could deduce the task that the network was constructed to per-
form even if we were given the complete equations and connec-
tions of the model. If, along with this information, we were told
what this task was, it is unlikely that we could figure out how
the network performs it. If we somehow managed to make any
progress along these lines, the people who constructed the net-
work could probably provide us with another one that performs
the same task but has a different connectome. In a similar way,
biological systems may operate in a more variable manner than
we have suspected, as has been stressed by Eve Marder
(Marder et al., 2007). These issues are particularly true of a class492 Neuron 60, November 6, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.of network models known as liquid state or echostate networks
(Maass et al., 2002; Jaeger, 2003). In these models, the vast ma-
jority of interneuronal connections are not directly related to the
task being performed (they are typically chosen randomly and
left unchanged), the exceptions being synapses onto the output
units of the network. Nevertheless, the tuned values of the syn-
apses onto the output units can only be understood through their
relationships to the random synapses. Such systems represent
enormous challenges for conventional anatomical and physio-
logical approaches.
The fact that the connectome of an artificial neural network
does not typically tell us what the network does or how it does
it should not be taken as an indication that this information is use-
less. Far from it. But wemust bewilling to bemore abstract in our
thinking. The important issue for an artificial network is not how it
works but how it was constructed, which means what training
procedures and modification rules were used to get it to perform
a task. Although this information is not provided directly by the
connectome, much can be inferred. For example, it is important
to know whether the network has a feedforward architecture or
has strong feedback loops. Other features of the network layout,
whether it has hubs or bottlenecks, how many layers it contains,
and its degree of heterogeneity, provide important clues as well.
Obtaining a high-resolution connectome in neuroscience will be
of great value, but artificial neural networks provide a cautionary
tale that reminds us that scientific revolutions tend to render un-
interesting as many questions as they answer. We will be fortu-
nate if the connectome project does this for neuroscience, but as
we launch ourselves into it we should appreciate that, as artificial
neural networks appear to suggest, we may be asking the wrong
questions.
What Matters and What Doesn’t?
Identifying the minimum set of features needed to account for a
particular phenomenon and describing these accurately enough
to do the job is a key component of model building. Anything
more than this minimum set makes the model harder to under-
stand and more difficult to evaluate. The term ‘‘realistic’’ model
is a sociological rather than a scientific term. The truly realistic
model is as impossible and useless a concept as Borges’ ‘‘map
of the empire that was of the same scale as the empire and that
coincided with it point for point’’ (Borges, 1975). In any model, a
phenomenonmust be accounted for by an approximate descrip-
tion of a subset of the features that exist in the natural system.
The art of modeling lies in deciding what this subset should be
and how it should be described. Testing the implications of in-
cluding different features is part of the ongoing activity that
theoretical neuroscientists need to do to advance the field.
An interesting lesson concerning approximation in modeling
arises from themathematical and computational work on synap-
tic mechanisms of memory storage mentioned in the introduc-
tion. This research involved considerable simplifications of the
relevant biology but, nevertheless, the message it generated—
that neural networks could store and recall huge amounts of in-
formation through synaptic plasticity—seemed so clear and un-
equivocal that it appeared to transcend these simplifications.
It wasn’t until considerably later that Stefano Fusi and Daniel
Amit revealed a fly in the ointment (Amit and Fusi, 1994). The
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that retained information about pre-existing lists of ‘‘memories.’’
Biological memory storage requires a continuous influx of infor-
mation to be stored, and this introduces severe problems be-
cause new memories tend to overwrite old ones (Grossberg,
1982). Amit and Fusi (1994) showed that one of the approxima-
tions in the original modeling work, allowing synaptic strengths
to vary without bound, has enormous implications when a net-
work operates in such a continuous manner. Eliminating this
approximation catastrophically reduces the memory storage ca-
pacity of themodels. The unbounded nature of the synapseswas
not an approximation that introduced a modest error into the re-
sults, but rather something that entirely changed theway the net-
work worked. These are the kinds of approximations wemust be
careful to avoid. The implications of this discovery, which are still
being worked out, are likely to revise our picture of memory stor-
age through synaptic plasticity dramatically (Fusi, 2002; Fusi
et al., 2005).
How are we to find our way through the morass of complexity
we face in even the simplest of neural systems? Describing the
full range of this complexity is impossible. Acknowledging that
the system is complex and heterogeneous may be more impor-
tant than accounting for exactly how it is complex. This does not,
however, represent less of a modeling challenge. Our models
maynot have tobe accurate in their details, but theymust capture
the wide range of the phenomena operating in neural circuitry.
In other words, breadth is more important than depth in neural
modeling.
The Future
Neural modelers tend to divide problems into fast and slow com-
ponents and, in most applications, the fast part is performing a
particular task whereas the slow part is learning it. The enormous
amount of attention given to long-term synaptic plasticity illus-
trates that learning is widely considered a job for the synapse.
Another aspect of this slower process that has received both
modeling and experimental attention is the modulatory rein-
forcement needed to guide learning (Schultz et al., 1997). How-
ever, once established by a plasticity procedure, synapses in
most models act as passive conveyors of information during the
faster performance of the learned task. A notable exception to
this is network models in which short-term plasticity plays an im-
portant functional role, as typified by the work of Misha Tsodyks
(most recently in Mongillo et al., 2008). Nevertheless, we more
commonly tend to think of synapses as the locus of learning and
memory, and neurons as the workhorses of dynamic computa-
tion. This may be radically wrong. Synapses are extraordinarily
complex biochemical devices that are likely to have computa-
tional potential far beyond what we currently model or under-
stand (Emes et al., 2008).Wemay encounter revelatory surprises
as these capabilities are uncovered experimentally and explored
theoretically.
As is often noted, computers can outperform humans bymany
orders of magnitude in arithmetic but are rather pathetic at visual
and auditory recognition tasks that we find effortless. We may
outperform machines in these tasks by being extraordinarily
skilled and prolific guessers and by being remarkably quick at
using small amounts of evidence to eliminate wrong guessesor confirm correct ones. Three elements are at play here: instant
access to very large memory stores, the ability to generate
hypotheses, and an interaction between internally generated hy-
potheses and external evidence that allows sensory data to veto
or support internal constructs extremely efficiently. Google ap-
pears to have solved the first of these requirements in a machine
setting, but the latter twoarecurrently beyondour understanding,
either in theworld of computers or in neuroscience (althoughgen-
erative models provide a start). This is where I think the future lies
in theoretical investigations of cognitive function. We must learn
how to build models that construct hypotheses through their
internally generated activity while remaining sensitive to the con-
straints provided by externally generated sensory evidence. As
outlined in this review, the past 20 years of research has pro-
duced interesting models of internally generated activity and of
sensory-driven responses, but themarriage of these two compo-
nents of cognition remains a challenge for the future.
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